Belief
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Belief | |
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| Type | Epistemic and psychological state |
| Field | Epistemology; Philosophy of mind |
| Core idea | Attitude of taking a proposition to be true |
| Assumptions | Agents can represent propositions; mental states can be evaluated for accuracy |
| Status | Foundational concept |
| Related | Knowledge; Justification; Truth; Reason |
Belief is an epistemic and psychological state in which an agent takes a proposition to be true. To believe something is to regard it as the case, even when that belief may later turn out to be false.
Belief plays a central role in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, serving as a basic unit in explanations of reasoning, action, and knowledge.
Core idea
At its core, belief involves commitment to a proposition. When an agent believes a proposition, they treat it as true for purposes of reasoning, inference, and action.
Belief is distinct from imagining, hoping, or supposing, which do not involve the same commitment to truth.
Belief and truth
Beliefs aim at truth: they are correct if the proposition believed is true and incorrect if it is false. This truth-directedness distinguishes belief from other mental attitudes.
However, believing something does not guarantee that it is true, and false beliefs are common.
Belief and justification
Beliefs may be evaluated in terms of justification. A belief is justified if it is supported by adequate reasons, evidence, or reliable processes.
Justification concerns how a belief is formed and maintained, not whether it is in fact true.
Belief and knowledge
Belief is a necessary component of knowledge but is not sufficient on its own. One may believe a true proposition without knowing it, for example when the belief lacks adequate support.
The relationship between belief, truth, and justification is a central topic in epistemology.
Degrees of belief
Some theories treat belief as a binary state: one either believes or does not believe a proposition. Others treat belief as gradational, allowing for degrees of confidence or credence.
Gradational approaches often connect belief to probability and uncertainty.
Belief and reasoning
Beliefs are inputs to reasoning. Reasoning involves forming new beliefs from existing ones and revising beliefs in light of evidence or argument.
The coherence and consistency of beliefs are often taken as indicators of rational belief management.
Belief and action
Beliefs influence action by shaping expectations about how the world is and how it will respond to intervention. An agent’s actions often presuppose beliefs about consequences.
Beliefs interact with desires, intentions, and preferences in guiding behavior.
Formation and revision
Beliefs are formed through perception, testimony, inference, and learning. They may be revised when new information becomes available or when inconsistencies are identified.
The norms governing belief revision are a central topic in epistemology and formal belief-change theory.
Voluntary and involuntary belief
Philosophers debate whether belief is subject to voluntary control. While agents can influence belief indirectly by seeking evidence, beliefs are often not directly chosen.
This raises questions about responsibility for belief.
Limits and disagreement
There is no single agreed theory of belief. Disagreement persists over its nature, its relation to other mental states, and the standards governing belief formation and revision.
These disagreements reflect broader debates about representation, truth, and rationality.
Status
Belief is a foundational concept in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Its analysis clarifies how agents represent the world and how beliefs function in reasoning, knowledge, and action.