Reason
|
Reason | |
|---|---|
|
| |
| Type | Philosophical concept |
| Field | Epistemology; Philosophy of action |
| Core idea | Consideration that counts in favor of a belief, action, or intention |
| Assumptions | Considerations can justify or motivate; agents can respond to reasons |
| Status | Foundational concept |
| Related | Reasoning; Intention; Action; Rationality |
Reason is a philosophical concept referring to a consideration that counts in favor of a belief, action, or intention. Reasons are used to justify what agents believe, explain why they act, and evaluate whether beliefs or actions are appropriate given available information.
The concept of reason plays a central role in epistemology and the philosophy of action, linking justification, motivation, and explanation.
Core idea
At its core, a reason is something that supports or favors a conclusion, belief, or course of action. To cite a reason is to offer a consideration that makes a belief more justified or an action more appropriate.
Reasons need not compel a single outcome; multiple reasons may support different or competing conclusions.
Reasons for belief
In epistemology, reasons are considerations that justify beliefs. Evidence, arguments, and observations are commonly treated as reasons for believing certain propositions.
Debates arise over whether reasons for belief must be facts, mental states, or relations between evidence and propositions.
Reasons for action
In the philosophy of action, reasons explain why agents act. A reason for action is typically understood as a consideration that makes an action intelligible or justified from the agent’s perspective.
Philosophers distinguish between motivating reasons, which explain why an agent acted, and normative reasons, which count in favor of acting whether or not the agent is motivated by them.
Normative and motivating reasons
A central distinction separates:
- Normative reasons — considerations that genuinely count in favor of a belief or action.
- Motivating reasons — considerations that actually move an agent to believe or act.
These may diverge when agents act for bad reasons or fail to act on good ones.
Reasons and reasoning
Reasons are inputs to reasoning. Reasoning is the process by which agents weigh reasons, draw conclusions, and revise beliefs or intentions.
Analyzing reasons helps clarify whether reasoning is sound, persuasive, or flawed.
Reasons and intention
Reasons play a role in the formation of intentions. Agents often form intentions in light of reasons, though reasons may underdetermine which intention is adopted.
This underdetermination highlights the role of choice and commitment in agency.
Reasons and causation
Philosophers debate whether reasons cause actions or merely rationalize them. Some accounts treat reasons as causes in a psychological sense, while others emphasize their normative explanatory role.
This debate connects reasons to broader issues in action theory and causation.
Reasons and responsibility
Attributions of responsibility often depend on whether an agent acted for reasons. Acting for reasons is commonly taken to indicate agency and control.
Cases involving coercion, ignorance, or compulsion raise questions about whether reasons were present or effective.
Limits and disagreement
There is no single agreed account of what reasons are or how they function. Disagreement persists over their ontology, their relation to mental states, and their role in explanation.
These disagreements reflect deeper differences about normativity, agency, and justification.
Status
Reason is a foundational concept across philosophy. Its analysis clarifies how beliefs and actions are justified, explained, and evaluated, and how agents are understood as responsive to considerations rather than mere causes.