Action
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Action | |
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| Type | Philosophical concept |
| Field | Philosophy of action; Epistemology |
| Core idea | Behavior attributable to an agent and explained in terms of reasons, intentions, or purposes |
| Assumptions | Agents can initiate behavior; some behavior is reason-responsive |
| Status | Established concept |
| Related | Choice; Agency; Intention; Responsibility |
Action is a philosophical concept referring to behavior that is attributable to an agent and explained, at least in part, in terms of reasons, intentions, or purposes. Actions are commonly contrasted with mere events or reflexes, which occur without agency or deliberation.
The analysis of action is central to the philosophy of action, with implications for ethics, responsibility, and social explanation.
Core idea
At its core, action involves doing something rather than merely having something happen. To act is to bring about a change in the world in a way that is connected to an agent’s reasons, intentions, or goals.
Not all bodily movements are actions. Actions are typically distinguished by their explanatory link to the agent’s mental states.
Action and agency
Action presupposes agency, the capacity of an entity to initiate and control behavior. Agents are treated as sources of action rather than as passive conduits of causal forces.
Debates about agency concern whether it requires consciousness, deliberation, or freedom from certain kinds of constraint.
Intention
A central concept in action theory is intention. Intentions are commonly understood as mental states that guide and organize action over time.
Philosophers examine whether intentions are distinct from desires and beliefs, and how they relate to planning, commitment, and control.
Reasons for action
Actions are often explained by citing reasons. A reason for action is typically understood as a consideration that counts in favor of performing the action.
Debate persists over whether reasons are psychological states, objective facts, or relational entities.
Action and causation
One major issue concerns how reasons relate to the causal production of action. Some accounts treat reasons as causes of action, while others emphasize non-causal explanations.
This issue connects action theory to broader debates about causation and explanation.
Voluntary and involuntary action
Philosophical and legal analyses distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions. Voluntary actions are those under the agent’s control, while involuntary actions result from coercion, compulsion, or impairment.
These distinctions are central to assessments of responsibility and blame.
Action and choice
Action is closely related to choice, but the two are not identical. Choice concerns selection among alternatives, while action concerns execution.
An agent may choose without successfully acting, or may act without explicit choice, such as in habitual behavior.
Action in explanation
Explanations of social and individual behavior often appeal to actions rather than mere events. Such explanations assume that understanding behavior requires reference to reasons, intentions, or norms.
Alternative approaches emphasize causal, structural, or situational explanations that downplay agency.
Limits and disagreement
There is no single accepted theory of action. Disagreements concern the role of mental states, the nature of agency, and the relation between reasons and causes.
These disagreements reflect deeper differences about explanation, responsibility, and human agency.
Status
Action is a foundational concept in philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of action and ethics. Its analysis clarifies how behavior is attributed to agents and how reasons, intentions, and causes interact in explaining what agents do.