Intention
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Intention | |
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| Type | Philosophical concept |
| Field | Philosophy of action; Philosophy of mind |
| Core idea | Mental state that directs and organizes action toward a goal |
| Assumptions | Agents can form plans; mental states can guide behavior over time |
| Status | Established concept |
| Related | Action; Agency; Reason; Planning |
Intention is a philosophical concept referring to a mental state that directs, guides, or organizes action toward a goal. Intentions play a central role in explaining why agents act as they do and how actions are coordinated over time.
The analysis of intention is central to the philosophy of action and intersects with the philosophy of mind through questions about mental causation and planning.
Core idea
At its core, an intention is a commitment to act in a certain way. To intend an action is to have a plan or aim that structures deliberation, decision-making, and behavior.
Intentions differ from mere desires in that they involve commitment and guidance rather than simple attraction to an outcome.
Intention and action
Intentions are closely linked to action. An action is typically intentional if it is performed in accordance with an intention, even if the outcome is not exactly as planned.
Philosophers examine whether all actions must be intentional and how unintended consequences relate to intentional action.
Intention and reasons
Intentions are often formed in response to reasons. Reasons provide considerations that count in favor of forming an intention, though they may not determine it uniquely.
Debate persists over whether reasons are causes of intentions or normative justifications.
Planning and coordination
One key role of intention is planning. Intentions allow agents to coordinate actions over time, resist distraction, and integrate means and ends.
This planning function distinguishes intentions from momentary impulses or preferences.
Prior, present, and future intentions
Philosophers sometimes distinguish between intentions formed in advance, intentions active during action, and standing intentions that persist over time.
These distinctions help analyze complex actions involving extended planning and execution.
Intention and control
Intentions are often associated with control over action. To act intentionally is to exercise control in light of an intention, even in the presence of uncertainty or interference.
Disagreements arise over how much control is required for intentional action.
Intention and responsibility
Intentions are central to assessments of responsibility. Actions performed intentionally are typically judged differently from accidental or coerced behavior.
Legal and moral evaluations often hinge on the presence or absence of intention.
Intention in non-human systems
Whether non-human animals or artificial systems can form intentions is a subject of debate. Proposed criteria include goal-directed behavior, planning capacity, and responsiveness to reasons.
These discussions intersect with questions about agency and moral status.
Limits and disagreement
There is no single agreed account of intention. Disagreement persists over its nature, its relation to desire and belief, and its role in action explanation.
These disagreements reflect broader debates about mental causation and agency.
Status
Intention is an established concept in philosophy of action. Its analysis clarifies how mental states guide behavior and how actions are organized over time.