Rationality
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Rationality | |
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| Type | Normative and descriptive concept |
| Field | Epistemology; Philosophy of mind; Decision theory |
| Core idea | Conformity of beliefs, reasoning, or actions to appropriate norms or standards |
| Assumptions | Norms of belief and action can be specified; conformity to norms can be evaluated |
| Status | Foundational concept |
| Related | Reasoning; Logic; Inference; Decision theory |
Rationality is a concept concerned with the extent to which beliefs, reasoning, or actions conform to appropriate norms or standards. In philosophical contexts, rationality is used to evaluate whether agents reason correctly, form justified beliefs, or make coherent decisions given their information and goals.
Rationality is studied in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, economics, and related disciplines, often with different emphases and criteria.
Core idea
At its core, rationality involves responsiveness to reasons. A belief or action is rational if it is supported by adequate reasons relative to a specified standard or framework.
Disagreement about rationality often reflects disagreement about which standards are appropriate.
Epistemic and practical rationality
Philosophers commonly distinguish between:
- Epistemic rationality — rationality of beliefs, focusing on evidence and justification.
- Practical rationality — rationality of actions, focusing on goals, preferences, and outcomes.
These forms of rationality may come apart in cases where justified beliefs conflict with optimal action.
Norms of rationality
Norms governing rationality may be logical, probabilistic, pragmatic, or context-dependent. Examples include logical consistency, coherence of beliefs, and appropriate updating of beliefs in light of evidence.
Debates arise over whether such norms are universal or vary across domains and agents.
Rationality and reasoning
Rationality provides standards for evaluating reasoning. Logical validity and probabilistic coherence are often treated as benchmarks for rational inference.
However, human reasoning frequently deviates from these idealized norms, raising questions about bounded rationality and cognitive limitation.
Rationality and decision-making
In decision theory, rationality is often defined in terms of preference consistency and expected utility maximization. These models specify how agents should choose under uncertainty.
Critics argue that such models oversimplify real-world decision-making and ignore contextual or ethical factors.
Descriptive vs normative accounts
A key distinction separates descriptive accounts, which study how agents actually reason and decide, from normative accounts, which specify how they ought to reason.
Tension between these perspectives motivates debates about the relevance of rational norms to human cognition.
Rationality and disagreement
Disagreements about rationality arise when agents with the same evidence reach different conclusions. Philosophers examine whether such disagreements can be rational, or whether rationality requires convergence of belief.
These discussions intersect with issues of peer disagreement and epistemic humility.
Limits and critiques
Some critiques argue that rationality is an overly narrow ideal that fails to capture important aspects of human thought, such as emotion, creativity, or social context.
Others question whether rational norms can be specified independently of cultural or practical considerations.
Status
Rationality is a foundational but contested concept across philosophy and the social sciences. Its analysis clarifies standards of belief and action while exposing tensions between ideal norms and actual cognitive practices.