Justification
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Justification | |
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| Type | Epistemic concept |
| Field | Epistemology |
| Core idea | What makes a belief epistemically acceptable or warranted |
| Assumptions | Beliefs can be supported by reasons; epistemic support can be evaluated |
| Status | Contested |
| Related | Belief; Knowledge; Reason; Evidence |
Justification is an epistemic concept concerned with what makes a belief acceptable, warranted, or reasonable to hold. To say that a belief is justified is to say that it is supported in an appropriate way, even if it later turns out to be false.
Justification plays a central role in epistemology, particularly in analyses of knowledge and rational belief.
Core idea
At its core, justification concerns epistemic support. A justified belief is one that is held for good reasons, based on evidence, or formed through reliable methods, depending on the theoretical framework adopted.
Justification is distinct from truth: a belief may be justified but false, or true but unjustified.
Justification and belief
Justification is commonly treated as a normative property of belief. It evaluates how a belief is formed, maintained, and revised, rather than its psychological origin alone.
The same belief may be justified for one agent and unjustified for another, depending on their evidence and cognitive situation.
Justification and knowledge
Justification is often treated as a necessary component of knowledge. Even when a belief is true, it typically does not qualify as knowledge unless it is appropriately justified.
Disagreement persists over whether justification must be internal to the agent’s perspective or may depend on external factors.
Internal and external approaches
One major distinction separates internalist and externalist accounts of justification.
Internal approaches require that justificatory factors be accessible to the agent, such as reasons or evidence the agent can reflect upon.
External approaches allow justification to depend on factors outside the agent’s awareness, such as the reliability of belief-forming processes.
Evidential support
Many accounts treat evidence as central to justification. On these views, beliefs are justified to the extent that they are supported by perceptual input, testimony, or other beliefs.
Disputes arise over what counts as evidence and how evidential support should be measured.
Coherence
Some theories emphasize coherence among beliefs rather than foundational evidence. According to these views, a belief is justified if it fits well within a coherent system of beliefs.
Critics argue that coherence alone may allow systematically false but internally consistent belief systems.
Reliability
Reliability-based approaches treat justification as a matter of how likely a belief-forming method is to produce true beliefs. On these views, justification depends on the connection between belief and truth, not solely on accessible reasons.
These approaches emphasize objective epistemic success over subjective perspective.
Defeasibility
Justification is often treated as defeasible. A belief may be justified given current information but lose its justification when new evidence becomes available.
This defeasibility reflects the dynamic and revisable nature of rational belief.
Justification and reasons
Justification is closely connected to reasons. Reasons are considerations that count in favor of holding a belief, and justification concerns whether those reasons are sufficient.
Debates persist over whether reasons must be facts, mental states, or relations between evidence and propositions.
Limits and disagreement
There is no single accepted theory of justification. Disagreement persists over its nature, its sources, and its relation to truth and reliability.
These disagreements reflect deeper tensions between subjective perspective and objective epistemic success.
Status
Justification is a foundational but contested concept in epistemology. Its analysis clarifies what it means for beliefs to be responsibly held and how epistemic evaluation differs from mere accuracy.