Truth
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Truth | |
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| Type | Epistemic and metaphysical concept |
| Field | Epistemology; Metaphysics |
| Core idea | Property of propositions that correctly represent how things are |
| Assumptions | Reality is structured; representations can succeed or fail |
| Status | Foundational concept |
| Related | Belief; Knowledge; Justification; Correspondence |
Truth is an epistemic and metaphysical concept concerned with the correctness of propositions, statements, or representations. To say that a proposition is true is to say that it accurately reflects how things are, rather than merely expressing belief, opinion, or convention.
Truth plays a central role in epistemology and metaphysics, underpinning notions of belief, knowledge, justification, and error.
Core idea
At its core, truth involves accuracy or correctness. A true proposition is one that matches or corresponds to the way the world is, while a false proposition fails to do so.
Truth is typically treated as independent of whether anyone believes or recognizes it.
Truth and belief
Truth is distinct from belief. Beliefs aim at truth, but may succeed or fail. A belief can be widely held yet false, or rarely held yet true.
This distinction underlies the possibility of error and correction.
Truth and justification
Justification concerns whether a belief is well-supported, not whether it is true. A belief may be justified yet false, or true yet unjustified.
This separation explains why justification alone is insufficient for knowledge.
Truth and knowledge
Truth is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for knowledge. Even well-justified beliefs do not count as knowledge if they are false.
Disagreement persists over whether truth must be understood in an objective or context-sensitive manner.
Theories of truth
Philosophers have proposed different accounts of what truth consists in, including:
- correspondence approaches, which relate truth to how things are in the world;
- coherence approaches, which relate truth to consistency within a system of beliefs;
- pragmatic approaches, which relate truth to practical success or usefulness;
- deflationary approaches, which treat truth as a logical or linguistic device rather than a substantive property.
These theories differ in their metaphysical commitments and explanatory goals.
Truth and language
Truth is commonly attributed to propositions or statements expressed in language. Philosophers debate whether truth applies primarily to sentences, propositions, beliefs, or other representational entities.
This debate intersects with questions about meaning and reference.
Truth and science
Scientific inquiry aims at truth, but scientific claims are often provisional and subject to revision. This raises questions about whether truth should be understood as an ideal limit or as a property of current theories.
Scientific realism and anti-realism offer competing views on this issue.
Truth and objectivity
Truth is often treated as objective, holding independently of perspectives or interests. However, some accounts emphasize the role of conceptual schemes, practices, or contexts in truth attribution.
These views differ on whether such dependence undermines objectivity.
Truth and disagreement
Persistent disagreement does not by itself imply the absence of truth. Parties may disagree while at most one side is correct, or while truth is difficult to determine.
Understanding disagreement requires distinguishing truth from justification and consensus.
Limits and disagreement
There is no single agreed theory of truth. Disagreement persists over its nature, its relation to reality, and its role in explanation.
These disagreements reflect broader tensions between metaphysical realism, linguistic analysis, and epistemic practice.
Status
Truth is a foundational concept in philosophy. Its analysis clarifies how beliefs, claims, and representations relate to the world and why error, correction, and inquiry are possible.