Preference
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Preference | |
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| Type | Foundational concept |
| Field | Decision theory; Economics; Philosophy |
| Core idea | Ordering of options or outcomes according to relative desirability |
| Assumptions | Agents can rank options; preferences can guide choice and evaluation |
| Status | Established concept |
| Related | Utility; Decision theory; Rationality; Choice |
Preference is a concept used to describe how an agent ranks options, outcomes, or states of affairs according to their relative desirability. To say that an agent prefers one option to another is to say that, given a choice, the agent would select the former over the latter, all else being equal.
Preferences play a central role in decision theory and economics, where they provide the basis for modeling choice, utility, and rational behavior.
Core idea
At its core, preference represents comparative evaluation. Preferences specify which options are better, worse, or equally desirable from the perspective of an agent.
Preference relations are typically assumed to be stable within a given context, allowing them to guide choice and reasoning.
Preference relations
Preferences are often modeled as binary relations between options. Common properties attributed to preference relations include:
- Completeness — any two options can be compared.
- Transitivity — if one option is preferred to a second, and the second to a third, then the first is preferred to the third.
- Reflexivity — each option is at least as good as itself.
These properties enable formal representation and analysis.
Preference and choice
Preferences are closely connected to observable choices. In many models, preferences are inferred from patterns of choice under varying conditions.
However, the relationship between preference and choice is not straightforward, as choices may be influenced by constraints, framing, or error.
Preference and utility
Preferences are often represented numerically using utility functions. A utility function represents preferences if it assigns higher values to preferred options.
Utility provides a convenient formal tool, but it does not add substantive content beyond the preference ordering itself.
Preference and rationality
Rational choice theories often impose consistency conditions on preferences. An agent is considered rational if their preferences satisfy certain structural properties and their choices reflect those preferences.
Disagreement arises over whether such conditions capture all relevant aspects of rational behavior.
Preference formation
Preferences may be shaped by learning, experience, social context, and biological factors. Philosophical and empirical work examines whether preferences are fixed, constructed, or context-dependent.
These issues complicate attempts to treat preferences as given inputs to decision models.
Normative and descriptive roles
Preferences play both normative and descriptive roles. Normatively, they are used to evaluate how agents ought to choose. Descriptively, they are used to model how agents in fact choose.
Tension between these roles motivates alternative approaches to modeling choice.
Limits and critiques
Some critics argue that not all values can be captured by preference rankings, particularly when moral, social, or incommensurable considerations are involved.
Others question whether preferences are sufficiently stable or well-defined to serve as foundational explanatory elements.
Status
Preference is a foundational concept in decision theory and economics. Its analysis clarifies the structure of choice and evaluation, while exposing assumptions about comparability, stability, and rationality.