Representation
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Representation | |
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| Type | Philosophical concept |
| Field | Philosophy of mind; Epistemology |
| Core idea | Relation by which something stands for, refers to, or encodes information about something else |
| Assumptions | Representational relations can be meaningfully analyzed; content can be distinguished from vehicle |
| Status | Conceptual |
| Related | Intentionality; Mental content; Consciousness; Epistemology |
Representation is a philosophical concept describing the relation by which one thing stands for, refers to, or encodes information about another. In philosophy of mind and epistemology, representation is used to explain how mental states, symbols, or models can be about objects, properties, or states of affairs.
The concept plays a central role in accounts of cognition, perception, language, and knowledge.
Core idea
At its core, representation involves a distinction between a vehicle and its content. The vehicle is the physical or structural bearer of representation, while the content is what the representation is about.
This distinction allows representations to be evaluated for accuracy, correctness, or adequacy relative to what they represent.
Mental representation
In philosophy of mind, mental representations are often invoked to explain beliefs, desires, perceptions, and thoughts. These mental states are treated as representational insofar as they encode information about the world or possible states of affairs.
Disputes concern how mental representations are structured, how their content is fixed, and whether representational explanation is necessary or sufficient for explaining cognition.
Representation and intentionality
Representation is closely related to intentionality, the property of mental states by which they are about something. Some accounts treat intentionality as reducible to representational relations, while others argue that representation presupposes intentionality.
The direction of explanation between these concepts remains contested.
Naturalistic accounts
Many theories attempt to explain representation in naturalistic terms, such as causal covariance, informational relations, or biological function. These accounts aim to ground representational content in objective relations between systems and their environments.
Critics argue that such approaches struggle to account for error, misrepresentation, and normativity.
Symbolic and non-symbolic representation
Representation is not limited to symbolic forms such as language or logic. Non-symbolic representations include perceptual states, maps, diagrams, and neural patterns.
Philosophers examine whether all representations can be reduced to a single type or whether multiple representational formats are required.
Representation in perception
Perceptual experience is often described as representational, presenting the world as being a certain way. On this view, perceptual states have content that can be accurate or inaccurate.
Alternative views hold that perception involves direct acquaintance with the world rather than representational mediation.
Representation and knowledge
In epistemology, representation plays a role in explaining how beliefs and models relate to reality. Questions arise about the fidelity of representations, the limits of representational accuracy, and the role of abstraction and idealization.
These issues intersect with discussions of underdetermination and theory choice.
Representation in artificial systems
Representation is central to debates about cognition in artificial systems. In artificial intelligence, researchers ask whether computational systems manipulate genuine representations or merely formal symbols with derived meaning.
These questions connect representation to intentionality, understanding, and semantic interpretation.
Limits and disagreement
There is no consensus on whether representation is fundamental or derivative, nor on how representational content should be grounded. Some philosophers argue that representational explanation should be replaced by alternative frameworks emphasizing action, embodiment, or relations.
The persistence of disagreement reflects differing views about explanation, normativity, and the role of mental content.
Status
Representation is a foundational but contested concept in philosophy of mind and epistemology. Its analysis helps clarify how systems relate to the world and how information-bearing states can support thought and knowledge.