G. E. Moore
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G. E. Moore | |
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| Born | 4 November 1873 |
| Died | 24 October 1958 |
| Nationality | British |
| Occupation | Philosopher |
| Known for | Common sense philosophy; critique of idealism; analytic method |
| Notable work | Principia Ethica; A Defence of Common Sense |
G. E. Moore was a philosopher whose work addressed ethics, knowledge, and the analysis of ordinary concepts. He is associated with early analytic philosophy and with opposition to the forms of idealism dominant in late nineteenth-century British philosophy.
His approach emphasized careful attention to ordinary language and everyday beliefs rather than comprehensive theoretical systems.
Early life and education
Moore was born in London and educated at Dulwich College before attending the University of Cambridge. He studied classics and philosophy and became associated with a group of philosophers later identified with the early analytic movement.
His early work developed in dialogue with contemporaries concerned with logic, language, and realism.
Opposition to idealism
Moore argued against philosophical idealism, particularly the view that reality is dependent on mental activity. He defended the existence of an external world and the independence of objects from perception.
These arguments relied on analysis of ordinary propositions rather than speculative metaphysical claims.
Ethics
In Principia Ethica (1903), Moore examined the nature of moral concepts and argued that “good” is a simple, non-natural property that cannot be defined in terms of natural facts.
He rejected attempts to reduce ethical statements to psychological or sociological explanations.
Common sense philosophy
Moore defended what he described as common sense beliefs, such as the existence of physical objects and other minds. He argued that such beliefs are more certain than philosophical arguments that call them into question.
This position was presented as a methodological stance rather than a comprehensive theory.
Method and style
Moore’s philosophical method emphasized clarity, precision, and careful distinction between concepts. He avoided systematic metaphysics and focused on resolving specific problems.
His style influenced teaching and discussion within academic philosophy.
Relationship to institutions
Moore spent most of his academic career at Cambridge, where he taught and edited the journal Mind. He was involved in shaping philosophical discussion through editorial and teaching roles.
He did not seek to establish a formal school or doctrine.
Limits and uncertainty
Moore’s ethical theory faced challenges regarding the status and explanation of non-natural properties. His reliance on common sense was criticized as insufficiently justified by some later philosophers.
Debate continues regarding the scope and limits of his methodological commitments.
Status
G. E. Moore is regarded as a significant figure in early analytic philosophy. His work remains relevant to discussions in ethics, epistemology, and philosophical method.