Free will
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Free will | |
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| Type | Philosophical problem |
| Field | Metaphysics; Philosophy of action; Ethics |
| Core idea | Capacity of agents to act in a way that is genuinely up to them |
| Assumptions | Agents exercise control over actions; alternative possibilities or relevant forms of control matter |
| Status | Contested |
| Related | Responsibility; Agency; Determinism; Autonomy |
Free will is a philosophical problem concerned with whether and in what sense agents can be said to act freely. To have free will is commonly understood as having control over one’s actions in a way that makes those actions genuinely attributable to the agent rather than to external forces alone.
Debates about free will are closely connected to questions of responsibility, agency, and moral evaluation.
Core idea
At its core, free will concerns whether agents are the true sources of their actions. An action is free, on many accounts, if it is up to the agent whether the action is performed.
Disagreement arises over what kind of control is required for freedom and whether such control is compatible with causal determination.
Determinism
A central issue in debates about free will is determinism, the view that all events are fixed by prior states of the world together with the laws of nature.
If determinism is true, every action is the inevitable result of earlier conditions, raising the question of whether agents could have acted otherwise.
Compatibilism
Compatibilism holds that free will is compatible with determinism. On this view, freedom does not require the ability to break causal laws, but rather the ability to act in accordance with one’s reasons, intentions, or desires without external coercion.
Compatibilist accounts often emphasize control, responsiveness to reasons, and the absence of constraint.
Incompatibilism
Incompatibilism denies that free will is compatible with determinism. Incompatibilists argue that genuine freedom requires alternative possibilities or a special form of agent control that determinism cannot provide.
Incompatibilism includes both libertarian views, which affirm free will and deny determinism, and skeptical views, which deny free will altogether.
Alternative possibilities
Many discussions of free will focus on whether freedom requires the ability to do otherwise. According to this requirement, an agent acts freely only if more than one course of action was genuinely available.
Critics argue that responsibility may not require such alternatives, pointing to cases where agents appear responsible despite lacking options.
Control and sourcehood
An alternative approach emphasizes sourcehood rather than alternatives. On this view, what matters is whether the action originates in the agent’s own capacities, values, or character.
Source-based accounts attempt to explain freedom in terms of authorship rather than choice among possibilities.
Free will and responsibility
Free will is often thought to ground moral responsibility. If agents lack free will, it is argued, practices of praise and blame may be unjustified.
Others argue that responsibility can be justified on pragmatic or social grounds even if metaphysical free will is absent.
Free will and science
Findings from psychology and neuroscience have been taken by some to challenge free will by emphasizing unconscious processes and causal influences on behavior.
Philosophical responses argue that such findings do not by themselves resolve questions about agency or freedom.
Limits and disagreement
There is no consensus on the nature or existence of free will. Disagreement persists over definitions, required conditions, and the relevance of scientific evidence.
These disagreements reflect deeper tensions between metaphysics, ethics, and explanations of human behavior.
Status
Free will remains a central and unresolved problem in philosophy. Its analysis clarifies assumptions about agency, control, and responsibility, even where definitive answers are unavailable.