Anti-realism
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Anti-realism | |
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| Type | Philosophical position |
| Field | Philosophy of science; Metaphysics; Epistemology |
| Core idea | View that scientific theories need not be taken as literally true descriptions of reality |
| Assumptions | Empirical success does not guarantee ontological truth; representation may outpace knowledge |
| Status | Contested |
| Related | Scientific realism; Instrumentalism; Truth; Underdetermination |
Anti-realism is a family of philosophical positions holding that scientific theories should not be interpreted as literally true descriptions of an independent reality, especially with respect to unobservable entities. According to anti-realist views, the success of science does not require commitment to the existence of all entities or structures posited by scientific theories.
Anti-realism is most prominently discussed in the philosophy of science and is commonly contrasted with scientific realism.
Core idea
At its core, anti-realism denies that empirical success alone warrants belief in the literal truth of scientific theories. While theories may be useful, predictive, or explanatorily powerful, anti-realists argue that this does not entail that their theoretical components accurately represent reality.
Anti-realism does not deny that science works; it questions what that success licenses us to believe.
Empirical adequacy
Many anti-realist positions emphasize empirical adequacy rather than truth. A theory is empirically adequate if it correctly describes observable phenomena, regardless of whether its unobservable elements correspond to real entities.
This focus allows anti-realists to accept scientific practice without committing to strong metaphysical claims.
Theoretical entities
Anti-realists are often skeptical about the existence of unobservable entities posited by science, such as particles, fields, or abstract structures. These entities may be treated as useful constructs rather than as components of reality.
This skepticism distinguishes anti-realism from realist interpretations of scientific ontology.
Historical motivation
One motivation for anti-realism comes from the history of science. Many past theories were highly successful in their time yet later rejected or radically revised.
Anti-realists argue that this history cautions against treating current theories as even approximately true.
Underdetermination
Anti-realism draws support from underdetermination, the idea that available evidence may support multiple, incompatible theories. If evidence does not uniquely determine theory choice, anti-realists argue, commitment to any one theory’s truth is unwarranted.
This challenge pressures realist accounts of theory confirmation.
Instrumental approaches
Some anti-realist views adopt an instrumental stance, treating theories as tools for organizing experience and generating predictions rather than as descriptions of reality.
On this view, the value of a theory lies in its usefulness, not its truth.
Truth and interpretation
Anti-realists do not necessarily reject the concept of truth, but they may restrict its application. Truth may be reserved for observable claims, operational statements, or empirically testable content.
Claims about unobservables may be treated as interpretive or pragmatic rather than factual.
Practice and language
Anti-realists note that scientific language often outpaces ontological commitment. Scientists may speak as if entities exist for convenience, without intending literal metaphysical endorsement.
Philosophical interpretation, on this view, should not overread scientific discourse.
Varieties of anti-realism
Anti-realism is not a single position. Variants include constructive empiricism, instrumentalism, and pragmatist approaches.
These views differ in how they interpret scientific success and theoretical commitment.
Limits and disagreement
Anti-realism faces challenges in explaining the depth and coherence of scientific success, particularly in cases involving novel prediction or technological application.
Debate persists over whether anti-realism adequately accounts for explanation, progress, and realism in practice.
Status
Anti-realism is a central and enduring position in the philosophy of science. Its analysis clarifies the distinction between usefulness, success, and truth, and it provides a counterweight to strong realist interpretations of scientific knowledge.