Scientific realism
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Scientific realism | |
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| Type | Philosophical position |
| Field | Philosophy of science; Metaphysics |
| Core idea | View that successful scientific theories describe, at least approximately, how the world is |
| Assumptions | Science aims at truth; theoretical entities may correspond to real features of the world |
| Status | Contested |
| Related | Philosophy of science; Truth; Explanation; Anti-realism |
Scientific realism is a philosophical position holding that successful scientific theories describe the world as it is, at least approximately. According to scientific realism, the entities, structures, and processes posited by well-supported scientific theories are not merely useful instruments but correspond, in some significant way, to reality.
Scientific realism is a central position in the philosophy of science and is closely connected to debates about truth, explanation, and scientific progress.
Core idea
At its core, scientific realism maintains that the success of science is best explained by assuming that scientific theories are, to some extent, true. When a theory reliably explains and predicts phenomena, realists argue that this success would be unlikely if the theory were radically disconnected from how the world actually is.
This claim is typically understood as approximate rather than exact truth.
Theoretical entities
A distinctive feature of scientific realism is its commitment to the reality of unobservable entities posited by science, such as electrons, genes, or fields. Realists hold that such entities exist independently of our theories about them.
This commitment distinguishes realism from views that treat theoretical entities as convenient fictions or calculational devices.
Truth and approximation
Scientific realism does not require that current theories be perfectly true. Instead, it holds that theories may be approximately true, capturing important structural or causal features of reality even if they are incomplete or partially mistaken.
This allows realism to accommodate scientific change and revision.
Explanation and success
A common argument for scientific realism appeals to explanation. The ability of theories to generate accurate predictions and unified explanations is taken as evidence that they track real features of the world.
On this view, explanatory success is not accidental but reflects an underlying correspondence between theory and reality.
Scientific progress
Scientific realism interprets scientific progress as movement toward better representations of the world. Later theories are often seen as improving upon earlier ones by explaining more phenomena or correcting previous errors.
Progress is thus understood as cumulative in some respects, even when conceptual change occurs.
Challenges to realism
Critics of scientific realism point to historical cases where successful theories were later rejected. These cases suggest that empirical success does not guarantee truth.
Such challenges motivate more cautious or selective versions of realism.
Realism and underdetermination
Scientific realism must address underdetermination, the idea that available evidence may support multiple incompatible theories. Realists respond by appealing to explanatory virtues or long-term convergence rather than immediate evidential uniqueness.
This response remains a point of dispute.
Varieties of realism
There is no single form of scientific realism. Variants include realism about entities, realism about structures, and realism about causal relations.
These variants differ in what aspects of scientific theories are taken to reflect reality.
Realism and practice
Scientific realism is often defended as aligning with scientific practice. Scientists typically speak and reason as if theoretical entities are real, and realist interpretations aim to respect this practice.
However, practice alone does not settle the philosophical debate.
Limits and disagreement
There is no consensus on scientific realism. Disagreement persists over its metaphysical commitments, its interpretation of success, and its response to historical change.
These disagreements reflect broader tensions between realism, skepticism, and instrumental approaches to science.
Status
Scientific realism is a central but contested position in the philosophy of science. Its analysis clarifies how science relates to truth, explanation, and reality, even where definitive resolution remains elusive.