Jump to content

Gilbert Ryle

From λ LUMENWARD
Revision as of 22:27, 5 January 2026 by Kauku (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{Infobox person | name = Gilbert Ryle | born = 19 August 1900 | died = 6 October 1976 | nationality = British | occupation = Philosopher | known_for = Philosophy of mind; ordinary language analysis; critique of dualism | notable_work = ''The Concept of Mind''; ''Dilemmas'' }} '''Gilbert Ryle''' was a philosopher whose work addressed the nature of mind, language, and philosophical method. He is associated with ordinary language analysis and with critiques of dualistic...")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)

Gilbert Ryle

No image available


Born 19 August 1900
Died 6 October 1976
Nationality British
Occupation Philosopher
Known for Philosophy of mind; ordinary language analysis; critique of dualism
Notable work The Concept of Mind; Dilemmas


Gilbert Ryle was a philosopher whose work addressed the nature of mind, language, and philosophical method. He is associated with ordinary language analysis and with critiques of dualistic accounts of mental phenomena.

His work emphasized examination of how mental concepts function in ordinary discourse rather than postulation of inner entities.

Early life and education

Ryle was born in Brighton, England, and educated at Brighton College before attending the University of Oxford. He studied classics and philosophy and remained affiliated with Oxford for most of his academic career.

His early work developed within debates concerning logic, language, and metaphysics.

Philosophy of mind

Ryle is known for his analysis of mental concepts in The Concept of Mind (1949). He argued that many traditional accounts of the mind commit category mistakes by treating mental processes as entities parallel to physical processes.

His analysis focused on dispositional descriptions and patterns of behavior rather than inner causes.

Critique of dualism

Ryle criticized Cartesian dualism, characterizing it as the “ghost in the machine.” He argued that dualistic frameworks misclassify mental vocabulary and generate pseudo-problems.

This critique was directed at conceptual structure rather than empirical psychology.

Ordinary language analysis

Ryle examined how philosophical confusions arise from misuse of language. He emphasized attention to ordinary linguistic practices and logical grammar as tools for clarification.

This approach aligned with broader trends in mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy.

Relationship to institutions

Ryle held academic positions at Oxford and served as editor of the journal Mind. He played an administrative role in shaping philosophical publication and discussion.

He combined teaching, editorial work, and research throughout his career.

Limits and uncertainty

Ryle’s account of mental concepts has been criticized for minimizing subjective experience. Some critics argue that his analysis does not fully address consciousness.

Debate continues regarding the scope and adequacy of his approach.

Status

Gilbert Ryle is regarded as a central figure in twentieth-century philosophy of mind and ordinary language analysis. His work remains a reference point in discussions of mental concepts and philosophical method.

Philosophy of mind

Ordinary language philosophy

Dualism

Category mistake